CONTINUOUS TIME CONTESTS

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This paper introduces a contest model in continuous time in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize.

Under mild assumptions on the cost function, we prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium outcome, even if players have to choose bounded stopping times. We derive a closed form of the equilibrium strategy and distribution. If the noise vanishes, the equilibrium outcome converges to—and thus selects—the symmetric equilibrium outcome of an all-pay auction. For positive noise levels, results differ from those of all-pay contests with complete information—for instance, participants make positive profits. We show that for two players and constant costs, the profits of each participant increase for higher costs of research, higher volatility, or lower productivity of each player. Hence, participants prefer a contest design which impedes research progress.

KEYWORDS: Contests, all-pay contests, continuous time games, discontinuous games.

1. INTRODUCTION

Two types of models are predominant in the literature on contests, races, and tournaments. In one of these, there is no learning about the performance measure or standings throughout the competition at all, while the other one considers full feedback about the performance of each player at all points in time. The former category includes all-pay contests with complete information (Hillman and Samet 1987; Siegel 2009, 2010), Tullock contests (Tullock 1980), silent timing games (Karlin 1953; Park and Smith 2008), and models with additive noise in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981). The latter category contains wars of attrition (Maynard Smith 1974; Bulow and Klemperer 1999), races (Aoki 1991; Hörner 2004; Anderson and Cabral 2007), and contest models with full observability such as Harris and Vickers (1987) and Moscarini and Smith (2007).

In this paper, we analyze an intermediate case in which there is partial feedback about the performance measure. More precisely, a player observes his own stochastic research progress over time, but he does not observe the progress of

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the other players or their effort decisions. A good example for this setting is an R&D contest. Each participant is well-informed about his own progress, but often uninformed about the progress of his competitors. For concrete examples of such competitions, see, e.g., Taylor (1995).

Formally, our model is an \( n \)-player contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion \( (X_t) \) with drift \( \mu \) and volatility \( \sigma \). As long as a player exerts effort, i.e., does not stop the process, he incurs flow costs \( c(X_t) \). The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize.

Under mild assumptions on the cost function—it has to be continuous and bounded away from zero—the game has a unique Nash equilibrium outcome. This outcome is implementable in stopping strategies which stop almost surely before a fixed time \( T < \infty \). Hence, provided the contest length is above a threshold, the equilibrium is independent of the contest length. In equilibrium, each player makes positive expected profits. For two players and constant costs, these profits increase if the productivity (drift) of both players decreases, the volatility increases, or costs increase. Hence, participants prefer a contest design which impedes progress.

The formal analysis proceeds as follows. Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution. The existence proof first characterizes the equilibrium distribution \( F(x) \) of values at the stopping time \( X_\tau = x \) uniquely up to its endpoints. We then use a Skorokhod embedding approach to show that there exists a stopping strategy, which induces this distribution. This technique from probability theory (e.g., Skorokhod 1961; 1965; for a survey, see Oblój 2004) was first introduced to game theory in Seel and Strack (2009).

Moreover, we verify a condition from a recent paper in mathematics (Ankirchner and Strack 2011) to show that there exists a bounded time stopping strategy—a strategy that stops almost surely before a fixed time \( T < \infty \) —which induces the equilibrium distribution. As most real-world contests have a fixed deadline, this result fortifies the predictions of the model. It is also one of main technical contributions of the paper, since this technique is also applicable to other models without observability. However, for tug-of-war models with full observability (Harris and Vickers 1987; Moscarini and Smith 2007; Gul and Pesendorfer 2011), one cannot construct bounded time equilibria in a similar way, because, for any fixed deadline, there is a positive probability that no player has a sufficiently lead until the deadline.

We then analyze the shape of the equilibrium distribution. As uncertainty vanishes, the distribution converges to the symmetric equilibrium distribution of an all-pay auction by Theorem 2. On the one hand, the model offers a microfoundation for the use of all-pay auctions to scrutinize environments in which uncertainty is not a crucial ingredient; on the other hand, it gives an equilibrium selection result between the equilibria of the symmetric all-pay auction analyzed in Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996). Moreover, this result serves as a benchmark to discuss how our predictions differ from all-pay models if volatility is
CONTINUOUS TIME CONTESTS

strictly positive.

For any $\sigma > 0$, Proposition 2 shows that all players make positive expected profits in equilibrium. Intuitively, agents use the private information about their progress to generate rents. The intuition is similar to an all-pay contest in which players have incomplete information about the valuation or effort cost of their rivals—see, e.g., Hillman and Riley (1989), Amann and Leininger (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1997), or Moldovanu and Sela (2001).

Finally, we analyze the special case of two players and constant costs. We derive a closed-form solution for the profits of each player, which depends only on the ratio $\frac{2\sigma^2}{c\mu^2}$ (Proposition 5). In particular, profits increase as costs $c$ increase, volatility $\sigma^2$ increases, or productivity $\mu$ decreases (Theorem 3). Hence, contestants prefer to have mutually worse technologies. This result, which does not hold in a static all-pay contest, goes along with the common intuition that players prefer competition to be less fierce.

1.1. Related Literature

In a companion paper (Seel and Strack, 2009), we analyze a model in which players do not have any research costs, but have a (usually negative) drift and face a bankruptcy constraint. The driving forces of both models differ substantially. In particular, in the present paper, contestants trade-off higher costs versus a higher winning probability, whereas in Seel and Strack (2009) the trade-off is between winning probability and risk. Also, the applications of Seel and Strack (2009) are related to finance, while the present paper is in spirit of the contest literature.

The paper entails a direct extension of the literature on silent timing games—see, e.g., Karlin (1953). Among others, this literature scrutinizes our setting for the case without uncertainty. Intuitively, adding uncertainty allows us to have a model with partial learning throughout the contest.

With a similar motivation, Taylor (1995) also analyzes a model in which players only learn about their own stochastic research success. However, in his T-period model, only the highest draw in a single period determines this success. The resulting equilibrium stopping rule is a threshold strategy, which stops whenever a player has a draw above a deterministic, time-independent value.

We proceed as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In Section 3, we prove that an equilibrium exists and it is unique. Section 4 discusses the relation to all-pay contests and derives the main comparative statics results. Section 5 concludes. Most proofs are relegated to the appendix.

2. THE MODEL

There are $n < \infty$ agents indexed by $i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, n\} = N$ who face a stopping problem in continuous time. At each point in time $t \in \mathbb{R}_+$, agent $i$ privately
observes the realization of a stochastic process \((X^i_t)_{t \in \mathbb{R}_+}\) with
\[
X^i_t = x_0 + \mu t + \sigma B^i_t.
\]
The constant \(x_0\) denotes the starting value of all processes; without loss of generality, we assume \(x_0 = 0\). The drift \(\mu \in \mathbb{R}_+\) is the common expected change of each process \(X^i_t\) per time, i.e., \(E(X^i_{t+\Delta} - X^i_t) = \mu \Delta\). The noise term is an \(n\)-dimensional Brownian motion \((B_t)\) scaled by \(\sigma \in \mathbb{R}_+\).

### 2.1. Strategies

A pure strategy of player \(i\) is a stopping time \(\tau^i\). This stopping time depends only on the realization of his process \(X^i_t\), as the player only observes his own process.\footnote{Mathematically, the agents’ stopping decision until time \(t\) has to be \(\mathcal{F}^i_t\)-measurable, where \(\mathcal{F}^i_t = \sigma(\{X^i_s : s < t\})\) is the sigma algebra induced by the possible observations of the process \(X^i_t\) before time \(t\). We require stopping times to be bounded by a real number \(T < \infty\) such that \(\tau^i < T\) almost surely.}

To incorporate mixed strategies, we allow for randomized stopping times—progressively \(\mathcal{F}^i_t\)-measurable functions \(\tau^i(\cdot)\) such that, for every \(r^i \in [0, 1]\), the value \(\tau^i(r^i)\) is a stopping time. Intuitively, agents draw a random number \(r^i\) from the uniform distribution on \([0, 1]\) before the game and play a stopping strategy \(\tau^i(r^i)\).\footnote{Although the unique equilibrium outcome of this paper can be obtained in pure strategies, we allow for mixing to obtain results in a more general framework.}

### 2.2. Payoffs

The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize \(p > 0\). Ties are broken randomly. Until he stops, each player incurs a flow costs \(c : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_+\), which depend on the current value of the process \(X^i_t\), but not on the time \(t\). The payoff \(\pi^i\) is thus
\[
\pi^i = \frac{p}{k} \mathbf{1}_{\{X^i_{\tau^i} = \max_{j \in N} X^j_{\tau^j}\}} - \int_0^{\tau^i} c(X^i_t) dt,
\]
where \(k = |\{i \in N : X^i_{\tau^i} = \max_{j \in N} X^j_{\tau^j}\}|\) is the number of agents who stop at the highest value. All agents maximize their expected profit \(E(\pi^i)\). We henceforth normalize \(p\) to 1, since agents only care about the trade-off between the winning probability and the cost-prize ratio. The cost function satisfies the following mild assumption:

**Assumption 1** For every \(x \in \mathbb{R}\), the cost function \(c : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}_+\) is continuous and bounded away from zero on \([x, \infty)\).
There are several possible interpretations for the production technology. For instance, one can interpret the drift as progress in research and the martingale part as learning. Alternatively, the process could measure the progress in the production of a prototype. In this interpretation, the variance might be due to different market prices of each component, which influence the value of the prototype. Apart from that, the prototype might turn out to require more or less components compared to the construction plan.

3. EQUILIBRIUM CONSTRUCTION

In this section, we first establish some necessary conditions on the distribution functions in equilibrium. In a second step, we prove existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium outcome and determine the equilibrium distributions depending on the cost function.

Every strategy of agent $i$ induces a (potentially non-smooth) cumulative distribution function (cdf) $F^i : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ of his stopped process $F^i(x) = P(X^i_{\tau_i} \leq x)$. Denote the endpoints of the support of the equilibrium distribution of player $i$ by

$$
\underline{x}^i = \inf \{ x : F^i(x) > 0 \}, \\
\overline{x}^i = \sup \{ x : F^i(x) < 1 \}.
$$

Let $\underline{x} = \max_{i \in N} \underline{x}^i$ and $\overline{x} = \max_{i \in N} \overline{x}^i$. In the next step, we establish a series of auxiliary results that are crucial to prove uniqueness of the equilibrium distribution.

**Lemma 1** At least two players stop with positive probability on every interval $I = (a, b) \subset [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]$.

**Lemma 2** No player places a mass point in the interior of the state space, i.e., for all $i$, for all $x > \underline{x}$: $P(X^i_{\tau_i} = x) = 0$. At least one player has no mass at the left endpoint, i.e., $F^i(\underline{x}) = 0$, for at least player $i$.

We omit the proof of Lemma 2, since it is simply a specialization of the standard logic in static game theory with a continuous state space; see, e.g., [Burdett and Judd (1983)]. Intuitively, in equilibrium, no player can place a mass point in the interior of the state space, since no other player would then stop slightly below the mass point. This contradicts Lemma 1.

Lemma 2 implies that the probability of a tie is zero. Thus, we can express the winning probability of player $i$ if he stops at $X^i_{\tau_i} = x$, given the distributions of the other players, as

$$
u^i(x) = P(\max_{j \neq i} X^j_{\tau_j} \leq x) = \prod_{j \neq i} F^j(x).
$$

**Lemma 3** All players have the same right endpoint, $\overline{x}^i = \overline{x}$, for all $i$. 
Lemma 4  All players have the same expected profit in equilibrium. Moreover, with certainty, each player loses at \( x \), i.e., \( u'(x) = 0 \), for all \( i \).

Lemma 5  All players have the same equilibrium distribution function, \( F^i = F \), for all \( i \).

As players have symmetric distributions, we henceforth drop the superscript \( i \).

The previous lemmata imply that each player is indifferent between any stopping strategy on his support. By Itô’s lemma, it follows from the indifference inside the support that, for every point \( x \in (\underline{x}, \overline{x}) \), the function \( u(\cdot) \) must satisfy the second order ordinary differential equation (ODE)

\[
(1) \quad c(x) = \mu u'(x) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} u''(x).
\]

As \( (1) \) is a second order ODE, we need two boundary conditions to determine \( u(\cdot) \) uniquely. One boundary condition is \( u(x) = 0 \) from Lemma 4. We determine the other one in the following lemma:

Lemma 6  In equilibrium, \( u'(x) = 0 \).

The idea of the proof in the appendix is simple. If the derivative was negative, \( u'(x) < 0 \), there would a profitable deviation at \( x \), which stops in the neighborhood of \( x \) rather than at the point itself.

Imposing the two boundary conditions, the solution to equation \( (1) \) is unique. To calculate it, we define \( \phi(x) = \exp\left(-\frac{2\mu x}{\sigma^2}\right) \) as a solution of the homogeneous equation \( 0 = \mu u'(x) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2} u''(x) \). To solve the inhomogeneous equation \( (1) \), we apply the variation of the constants formula. We then use the two boundary conditions to calculate the unique solution candidate. Finally, we rearrange with Fubini’s Theorem to get

\[
u(x) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{for } x < \underline{x} \\
\frac{1}{\mu} \int_{\underline{x}}^x c(z)(1 - \phi(x - z))dz & \text{for } x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}] \\
1 & \text{for } \overline{x} < x.
\end{cases}
\]

By symmetry of the equilibrium strategy, the function \( F : \mathbb{R} \to [0, 1] \) satisfies \( F(x) = n^{-1/2} u(x) \). Consequently, the unique candidate for an equilibrium distribution is

\[
F(x) = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{for all } x < \underline{x} \\
\frac{1}{n} \int_{\underline{x}}^x c(z)(1 - \phi(x - z))dz & \text{for all } x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}] \\
1 & \text{for all } \overline{x} < x.
\end{cases}
\]

In the next step, we verify that \( F \) is a cumulative distribution function, i.e., that \( F \) is nondecreasing and that \( \lim_{x \to \infty} F(x) = 1 \).
Lemma 7  $F$ is a cumulative distribution function.

Proof: By construction of $F$, $F(x) = 0$. Clearly, $F$ is increasing on $(\underline{x}, \overline{x})$, as the derivative with respect to $x$,

$$F'(x) = \frac{F(x)^{2-n}}{(n-1)!} \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \int_{\underline{x}}^{x} c(z) \phi(x-z)dz,$$

is greater than zero for all $x > \underline{x}$. It remains to show that there exists an $x > \underline{x}$ such that $F(x) = 1$.

$$F(x)^{n-1} = \frac{1}{\mu} \int_{\underline{x}}^{x} c(z)(1 - \phi(x-z))dz$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{\mu} \inf_{y \in [\underline{x}, \infty)} c(y) \left( x - \underline{x} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} (1 - \phi(x-z)) \right)$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{\mu} \inf_{y \in [\underline{x}, \infty)} c(y) (x - \underline{x} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu})$$

Assumption 1 implies the cost function $c(\cdot)$ is bounded away from zero. Consequently, $\inf_{y \in [\underline{x}, \infty)} c(y)$ is strictly greater than zero. Continuity of $F$ implies that there exists a point $\overline{x} > \underline{x}$ such that $F(\overline{x}) = 1$. Q.E.D.

The next lemma derives a necessary condition for a distribution $F$ to be the outcome of a strategy $\tau$.

Lemma 8  If $\tau \leq T < \infty$ is a bounded stopping time that induces the continuous distribution $F(\cdot)$, i.e., $F(z) = P(X_\tau \leq z)$, then $1 = \int_{\underline{x}}^{\overline{x}} \phi(x) F'(x) dx$.

Proof: Observe that $(\phi(X_t))_{t \in [\underline{x}, \infty)}$ is a martingale. Hence, by Doob’s optional stopping theorem, for any bounded stopping time $\tau$,

$$1 = \phi(X_0) = E[\phi(X_\tau)] = \int_{\underline{x}}^{\overline{x}} \phi(x) F'(x) dx.$$

Q.E.D.

We use the necessary condition from Lemma 8 to prove that the equilibrium distribution is unique.

Proposition 1  There exists a unique pair $(\underline{x}, \overline{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^2$ such that the distribution

$$F(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for all } x \leq \underline{x} \\ \frac{1}{\mu} \int_{\underline{x}}^{x} c(z)(1 - \phi(x-z))dz & \text{for all } x \in (\underline{x}, \overline{x}) \\ 1 & \text{for all } x \geq \overline{x} \end{cases}$$

is the unique candidate for an equilibrium distribution.
PROOF: As $F$ is continuous, the right endpoint $\bar{x}$ satisfies $1 = \int_{\bar{x}}^{x} F'(x; \bar{x}, x) \, dx$. Since $F'(x; \bar{x}, x)$ is independent of $\bar{x}$, we henceforth drop the dependency in our notation. By the implicit function theorem,

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial x} = -\frac{\int_{\bar{x}}^{x} \frac{\partial}{\partial x} F'(x; \bar{x}) \, dx}{F'(x; \bar{x})} = -\frac{\int_{\bar{x}}^{x} \frac{\partial}{\partial x} F'(x; \bar{x}) \, dx}{F'(x; \bar{x})}. \quad (2)$$

Lemma 8 states that any feasible distribution satisfies $1 = \int_{\bar{x}}^{x} F'(x; \bar{x}) \phi(x) \, dx$. Applying the implicit function theorem to this equation gives us

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial x} = -\frac{\int_{\bar{x}}^{x} \frac{\partial}{\partial x} F'(x; \bar{x}) \phi(x) \, dx}{F'(x; \bar{x})} < 0 \quad (3)$$

The last inequality follows from $\frac{\partial}{\partial x} F'(x; \bar{x}) \geq 0$. Hence, conditions (2) and (3) intersect exactly once. Thus, in equilibrium, both the left and right endpoints are unique.

Hence, each equilibrium strategy induces the distribution $F$. The next lemma shows that this condition is also sufficient.

**Lemma 9** Every strategy that induces the unique distribution $F$ from Proposition 1 is an equilibrium strategy.

**Proof:** Define $\Psi(\cdot)$ as the unique solution to (1) with the boundary conditions $\Psi(\bar{x}) = 0$ and $\Psi'(\bar{x}) = 0$. By construction, the process $\Psi(X_t) - \int_0^t c(X_s) \, ds$ is a martingale and $\Psi(x) = u(x)$ for all $x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$. As $\Psi'(x) < 0$ for $x < \bar{x}$ and $\Psi'(x) > 0$ for $x > \bar{x}$, $\Psi(x) > u(x)$ for all $x \not\in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$. For every stopping time $S$, we use Itô’s Lemma to calculate the expected value

$$\mathbb{E}[u(X_S) - \int_0^S c(X_t) \, dt] \leq \mathbb{E} \left[ \Psi(X_S) - \int_0^S c(X_t) \, dt \right] = \Psi(X_0) - u(X_0) = \mathbb{E}(u(X_0)).$$

The last equality results from the indifference of every agent to stop immediately with the expected payoff $u(X_0)$, or to play the equilibrium strategy with the expected payoff $\mathbb{E}(u(X_0))$. \(Q.E.D.\)
The intuition is simple. By construction of $F$, all agents are indifferent between all stopping strategies, which stop inside the support $[\bar{x}, \bar{x}]$. As every agent wins with probability one at the right endpoint, it is strictly optimal to stop there. The condition $F'(x) = 0$ ensures that it is also optimal to stop at the left endpoint.

So far, we have verified that a bounded stopping time $\tau \leq T < \infty$ is an equilibrium strategy if and only if it induces the distribution $F(\cdot)$, i.e., $F(z) = P(X_\tau \leq z)$. To show that the game has a Nash equilibrium, the existence a bounded stopping time inducing $F(\cdot)$ remains to be established. The problem of finding a stopping time $\tau$ such that a Brownian motion stopped at $\tau$ has a given centered probability distribution $F$, i.e., $F \sim B_\tau$, is known in the probability literature as the Skorokhod embedding problem (SEP). Since its initial formulation in Skorokhod (1961, 1965), many solutions have been derived; for a survey article, see Oblój (2004). In a recent mathematical paper, Ankirchner and Strack (2011) find conditions guaranteeing the existence of stopping times $\tau$ that are bounded by some real number $T < \infty$, and embed a given distribution in Brownian motion, possibly with drift. In addition to the assumption stated in the next lemma, Ankirchner and Strack (2011) assume that the condition in Lemma 8 holds, which we have already imposed. They define $g(x) = F^{-1}(\Phi(x))$, where $\Phi(x) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{x} \exp\left(\frac{z^2}{2}\right)dz$ is the density function of the normal distribution.

**Lemma 10 (Ankirchner and Strack, 2011, Theorem 2)** Suppose that $g(\cdot)$ is Lipschitz-continuous with Lipschitz constant $\sqrt{T}$. Then the distribution $F$ can be embedded in $X_t = \mu t + B_t$, with a stopping time that stops almost surely before $T$.

The main conceptual innovation is the bounded time requirement $\tau < T$. This is not trivial, as for any fixed time horizon $T$, there exists a positive probability that $X_t$ does not leave any interval $[a, b]$ with $a < X_0 < b$. Hence, a mixture over cutoff strategies of the form

$$\tau_{a,b} = \inf \{ t : R_+ : X_t \notin [a, b] \},$$

cannot be used to implement $F$. The proof in Ankirchner and Strack (2011) constructs a pure strategy for any distribution, which meets the Lipschitz condition. This type of equilibrium, which is independent of the deadline provided it is sufficiently high, cannot be obtained in tug-of-war models with full observability (Harris and Vickers, 1987; Moscarini and Smith, 2007; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2011). Intuitively, for any fixed deadline, in these models there is a positive probability that no player has a sufficient lead until the deadline, which detains a similar result.

The previous lemma enables us to prove the main result of this section:
Figure 1.— The density function $F'(\cdot)$ for the parameters $n = 2, \mu = 3, \sigma = 1$ and the cost-functions $c(x) = \exp(x)$ solid line and $c(x) = \frac{1}{2}\exp(x)$ dashed line.

**Theorem 1** The game has a Nash equilibrium.

The proof in the appendix verifies Lipschitz continuity of the function $g$, which makes Lemma 10 applicable. Thus, a Nash equilibrium in bounded time stopping strategies exists, and, by Proposition 1, the equilibrium distribution $F$ is unique.

### 4. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS

#### 4.1. Convergence to the All-pay Auction

This subsection considers the relationship between the literature on all-pay contests and our model for vanishing noise. We first establish an auxiliary result about the left endpoint:

**Lemma 11** If the noise vanishes, the left endpoint of the equilibrium distribution converges to zero, i.e., $\lim_{\sigma \to 0} x = 0$.

**Proof:** For any bounded stopping time, for any $\sigma > 0$, feasibility implies that $x \leq 0$. By contradiction, assume there exists a constant $\epsilon$ such that $x \leq \epsilon < 0$ for some sequence $(\sigma_k)_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ with $\lim_{k \to \infty} \sigma_k = 0$. Then $F'$ is bounded away from

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*It is straightforward to show that the distribution $F$ is also the unique equilibrium distribution in the space of finite time stopping strategies.*
zero by
\[
F'(x) = \frac{F(x)^2 - n}{n - 1} \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \int_x^\infty c(z)\phi(x-z)dz \\
\ge \frac{1}{n - 1} \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \int_x^\infty c(z)\phi(x-z)dz \\
= \frac{1}{\mu(n-1)} \left( \inf_{y \in [\epsilon, \infty)} c(y) \right) (1 - \phi(x-\epsilon)).
\]
For every point \( x < 0 \), \( \lim_{\sigma_k \to 0} \phi(x) = \infty \). Thus, \( \lim_{\sigma_k \to 0} \int_0^x F'(x)\phi(x)dx > 1 \), which contradicts feasibility, because \( \int_0^x F'(x)\phi(x)dx \leq \int_x^\infty F'(x)\phi(x)dx = 1 \).

Q.E.D.

Taking the limit \( \sigma \to 0 \), the equilibrium distribution converges to
\[
\lim_{\sigma \to 0} F(x) = \frac{n-1}{\sqrt{1}} \frac{1}{\mu} \int_0^x c(z)dz.
\]
In a static \( n \)-player all-pay auction, the equilibrium distribution is
\[
F(x) = \frac{n-1}{\sqrt{x/v}},
\]
where \( x \) is the total outlay of a participant and \( v \) is her valuation; see, e.g., [Hillman and Samet (1987)]. In our case, the total outlay depends on the flow costs at each point, the speed of research \( \mu \), and the stopping time \( \tau \). More precisely, it is \( \int_0^x c(z)\mu dz \). The valuation \( v \) in the analysis of Hillman and Samet (1987) coincides with the prize \( p \)—which we have normalized to one—in our contest. This yields us the following proposition:

**Theorem 2** For vanishing noise, the equilibrium distribution converges to the symmetric equilibrium distribution of an all-pay auction.

Thus, our model supports the use of all-pay auctions to analyze contests in which the variance is negligible. Figure 4.1 illustrates the similarity to the all-pay auction equilibrium if variance \( \sigma \) and costs \( c(\cdot) \) are small in comparison to the drift \( \mu \).

Moreover, the symmetric all-pay auction has multiple equilibria—for a full characterization see Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996). This paper offers a selection criterion in favor of the symmetric equilibrium, in which no participant places a mass point at zero. Intuitively, all other equilibria of the symmetric all-pay auction include mass points at zero for some players, which is not possible in our model for any positive \( \sigma \) by Lemma 2.
Figure 2.— This figure shows the density function \( F'(\cdot) \) with support \([-0.71, 5.45]\) for the parameters \( n = 2, \mu = 3, \sigma = 1 \) and the cost-functions \( c(x) = \frac{1}{2} \) (solid line) and for the same parameters the equilibrium density of the all-pay auction with support \([0, 6]\) (dashed line).

4.2. Comparative Statics and Rent Dispersion

Proposition 2 has linked all-pay contests with complete information to our model for the case of vanishing noise. In the following, we scrutinize how the predictions differ for positive noise. In a symmetric all-pay contest with complete information, agents make zero profits in equilibrium. This does not hold true in our model for any positive level of variance \( \sigma \):

**Proposition 2**  In equilibrium, all agents make strictly positive expected profits.

**Proof:** In equilibrium, agents are indifferent between stopping immediately and the equilibrium strategy. Their expected profit is thus \( u(0) \), which is strictly positive as \( x < 0 \).

Q.E.D.

Intuitively, agents generate informational rents through their private information about the research progress. A similar result is known in the literature on all-pay contests with incomplete information, see, e.g., Hillman and Riley (1989), Amann and Leininger (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1997), and Moldovanu and Sela (2001). In these models, participants take a draw from a distribution prior to the contest, which determines their effort cost or valuation. The outcome of the draw is private information. In contrast to this, private information about one’s progress arrives continuously over time in our model.

The next results show the comparative statics in the number of players for constant costs. We define the support length as \( \Delta = \pi - x \).
Lemma 12 If the number of players $n$ increases and $c(x) = c$, the support length $\Delta$ remains constant and both endpoints increase.

Proof: If $c(x) = c$, $F(\pi) - F(x)$ clearly depends only on $\Delta$. Hence, for $F(\pi) - F(x) = 1$, $\Delta$ has to be constant. As $F$ gets more concave if $n$ increases, by feasibility $x \nearrow$ and $\pi \nearrow$.

Q.E.D.

Proposition 3 If the number of agents $n$ increases and $c(x) = c$, the expected profit of each agent decreases.

Proof: The function $u(x)$ depends only on $x - x$. As $n$ increases, $x$ increases by Lemma 12. Thus, the expected value of stopping immediately, $u(0)$, which is an optimal strategy in both cases, decreases as $n$ increases.

Q.E.D.

Hence, in accordance with most other models, each player is worse off if the number of contestants increases.

4.3. The Special Case of Two Players and Constant Costs

We now restrict attention to the case $n = 2$ and $c(x) = c$ to get more explicit results. For this purpose, we require additional notation. In particular, we denote by $W_0 : [-\frac{1}{e}, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}_+$ the principal branch of the Lambert $W$-function. This branch is implicitly defined on $[-\frac{1}{e}, \infty)$ as the unique solution of $x = W(x) \exp(W(x))$, $W \geq -1$. Define $h : \mathbb{R}_+ \to [0, 1]$ by

$$h(y) = \exp(-y - 1 - W_0(-\exp(-1 - y))).$$

The next proposition pins down the left and right endpoints of the support of the players.

Proposition 4 The left and right endpoint are

$$x = \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} \left( 2 \log(1 - h\left(\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}\right)) - \log\left(\frac{4\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}\right) \right),$$

$$\pi = \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} \left( 2 \log(1 - h\left(\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}\right)) - \log\left(\frac{4\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}\right) - \log\left(h\left(\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}\right)\right) \right).$$

For an illustration how the endpoints change depending on the parameters, see Figure 3. The next proposition derives a closed-form solution of the profits $\pi$ of each player.

Proposition 5 The equilibrium profit of each player depends only on the ratio $y = \frac{2\mu}{c\sigma^2}$. It is given by

$$\pi = \frac{(1 - h(y))^2}{2y^2} - \frac{2 \log(1 - h(y)) - \log(2y) - 1}{y}.$$
Figure 3. — This figure shows the left endpoint $x$ and the right endpoint $\bar{x}$ for $n = 2, \sigma = 1, \mu = 1$ and constant cost $c = 1$ varying the productivity $\mu$ in the first figure, the costs $c$ in the second figure and the variance $\sigma$ in the third.

Given the previous proposition, it is simple to establish the main comparative static result of this paper.

**Theorem 3** The equilibrium profit of each player increases if costs increase, variance increases, or drift decreases.

To get an intuition for the result, we decompose the term $\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}$, which determines the equilibrium profit of the players, into two parts:

$$\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2} = \underbrace{\frac{\mu}{c}}_{\text{Productivity}} \times \underbrace{\frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2}}_{\text{Signal to noise ratio}}.$$  

The first term is the productivity $\frac{\mu}{c}$ of the agents. As firms get more productive, competition becomes more fierce and each firm makes less profits. The second term $\frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2}$ is the signal to noise ratio, which measures how informative the signal $X_i^\tau$ is about $\tau^i$. Intuitively, if the signal to noise ratio decreases, the outcome $X_i^\tau$ becomes less correlated with agent $i$'s effort choice $\tau^i$. In turn, this reduces his incentives to exert effort and thereby the cost of his expected stopping time. As his winning probability in equilibrium remains constant, his profits are decreasing in the signal to noise ratio. In summary, participants prefer to have mutually worse—more costly, more random, or less productive—technologies. Even for a perfectly uninformative signal, however, agents cannot extract the full surplus:
**Figure 4.**—This figure shows the equilibrium profit $F(0)$ of the agents on the $y$-Axes for $n = 2$ constant cost-functions $c(x) = c \in \mathbb{R}_+$ with $y = \frac{2 \mu^2}{c \sigma^2}$ on the $x$-Axes.

**Proposition 6**  The equilibrium profit of each agent is bounded from above by 4/9.

**Proof:** The agents profit is decreasing in $y = \frac{2 \mu^2}{c \sigma^2} \geq 0$ by Theorem 3. Hence, profits are bounded from above by $\lim_{y \to 0} u(0)$. By l’Hôpital’s rule,

$$
\lim_{y \to 0} \frac{(1 - h(y))^2}{2y^2} - \frac{2 \log(1 - h(y)) - \log(2y) - 1}{y} = \frac{4}{9}.
$$

$Q.E.D.$

The expected equilibrium effort $E(\tau^i)$ is bounded from below by

$$
\frac{4}{9} \geq E(F(X^i_{\tau^i}) - c\tau^i) = \frac{1}{2} - ce(\tau^i)
$$

$\Leftrightarrow$  $E(\tau^i) \geq \frac{1}{18c}.$

5. **CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION**

In this paper, we have introduced a model of contests in continuous time in which each player learns only about his own research progress. Under mild assumptions on the cost function, a Nash equilibrium outcome exists and is unique. If the research progress contains little uncertainty, the equilibrium is close to the outcome of the symmetric equilibrium of a static all-pay auction. Thus, our model provides an equilibrium selection result for the symmetric all-pay auction. If the research outcome is uncertain, players prefer mutually higher
research costs, worse technologies, and higher uncertainty. These comparative
statics, which go along with the intuition that players prefer competition to be
less fierce, cannot be obtained in a static all-pay contest.

From a technical perspective, we have introduced a method to construct equi-
libria in continuous time games that are independent of the time horizon. Fur-
thermore, we have introduced a constructive method to calculate a lower bound
on the time horizon that ensures the existence of such equilibria. These method-
ological contributions should prove useful to future research and add to the
general understanding of continuous time models.

6. APPENDIX

PROOF OF LEMMA 1 As players have to use bounded time stopping strate-
gies, each player $i$ stops with positive probability on every subinterval of $[\tau^i, \overline{\tau}^i]$. Hence, it suffices to show that at least two players have $\tau^i$ as their right end-
point. Assume, by contradiction, only player $i$ has $\tau^i$ as his right endpoint. Denote $\tau^{-i} = \max_{j \neq i} \tau^j$. Then, for any $\epsilon > 0$, at $\tau^{-i} + \epsilon$, player $i$ strictly prefers to stop, which yields him the maximal possible winning probability of $1$ without
any additional costs. This contradicts the optimality of a strategy, which stops
at $\overline{\tau}^i > \tau^{-i} + \epsilon$.

Q.E.D.

REMARK 1 We write $\tau^i_{(a,b)}(x)$ shorthand for $\inf \{ t : X^i_t \notin (a,b) | \forall s \leq t \}$ in the
next three proofs. Clearly, $\tau^i_{(a,b)}(x)$ is not a bounded time strategy, but we use it
to bound the payoffs. Moreover, for sufficiently large time horizon $T$, the payoff
from stopping at $\min \{ \tau^i_{(a,b)}(x), T \}$ is arbitrarily close to that of $\tau^i_{(a,b)}(x)$.

PROOF OF LEMMA 2 Assume $\overline{\tau}^j > \tau^i$. For at least two players $j, j'$, the payoff
from $\tau^j_{(x, \tau^i)}(\overline{\tau}^i)$ is weakly higher than from stopping at $X^j_t = \overline{\tau}^j$ by Lemma 1. By Lemma 2, at least one of these players—denote it $j$—wins with probability
zero at $\overline{\tau}^j$. Note that $u^i(\tau^i) = \prod_{h \neq i} F^h(\tau^i) < \prod_{h \neq j} F^h(\tau^j) = u^j(\tau^j)$, because $F^j(\tau^j) = 1 > F^j(\tau^i)$.

Optimality of $\tau^j_{(x, \tau^j)}(\tau^i)$ implies

$$u^j(\tau^i) \leq P(X^j_{t_\tau} = \overline{\tau}^j | \tau^j_{(x, \tau^j)}(\overline{\tau}^i))u^j(\tau^j) - E(c(\tau^j_{(x, \tau^j)}(\tau^i))).$$

On the other hand,

$$u^i(\tau^i) < u^j(\tau^j) \leq P(X^j_{t_\tau} = \overline{\tau}^j | \tau^j_{(x, \tau^j)}(\tau^i))u^j(\tau^j) - E(c(\tau^j_{(x, \tau^j)}(\tau^i))).$$

Hence, at $X^j_t = \overline{\tau}^j$, for a sufficiently long time horizon $T$, player $i$ can profit-
itably deviate by stopping at $\min \{ \tau^i_{(a,b)}(x), T \}$. This contradicts the equilibrium
assumption.

Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. To prove the first statement, we distinguish two cases. 

(i) If at least two players have $F^i(x) = 0$, then $u^i(x) = 0 \forall i$. Assume there exists a player $j$ who makes less profit than a player $i$, where $\pi^i \leq P(X^i_{\tau^i} = \pi|\tau^i_{(x,\pi)}(0)) - E(c(\tau^i_{(x,\pi)}(0)))$. If player $j$ deviates to the strategy $\min\{\tau^j_{(x,\pi)}(0),T\}$, player $j$ gets a profit arbitrarily close to $\pi^i$; this contradicts optimality of player $j$’s strategy.

(ii) If only one player has $F^i(x) = 0$, then $u^i(x) > 0$. For a given $x$, proof leads to a contradiction.

Proof of Lemma 5. Recall that all players have the same profit, and $u^i(x) = 0 \forall i$. Each player stops on any interval $I \subset [x,\pi]$ with positive probability, since stopping times are bounded. By contradiction, assume $u^i(x) > u^j(x)$ for some players $i, j$ and some value $x$. As it is weakly optimal for player $i$ to continue at $x$ with $\tau^i_{(x,\pi)}(x)$, this strategy is strictly optimal for player $j$. At $x$, player $j$ thus has a bounded time stopping strategy whose expected payoff is arbitrarily close to $u^i(x)$, which contradicts $u^i(x) > u^j(x)$. Hence, $u^i(x) = u^j(x)$ holds globally, which implies $F^i(x) = F$, for all $i$.

Q.E.D.

Proof of Lemma 6. By definition, $u(x) = 0$, for all $x \leq x$. Hence, the left derivative $\partial_+u(x)$ is zero. It remains to prove that the right derivative $\partial_+u(x)$ is also zero. For a given $u : R \rightarrow R_+$, let $\Psi : R \rightarrow R$ be the unique function that satisfies the second order ordinary differential equation $c(x) = \mu\Psi'(x) + \frac{\sigma^2}{2}\Psi''(x)$ with the boundary conditions $\Psi(x) = \partial_+u(x)$ and $\Psi'(x) = \partial_+u(x)$. As $\Psi'(x) > 0$, there exists a point $\hat{x} < x$ such that $\Psi(\hat{x}) < 0 = u(\hat{x})$. Consider the strategy $S$ that stops when either the point $\hat{x}$ or $\pi$ is reached or at 1,

$$S = \min\{1, \inf\{t \in R_+ : X^i_t \notin [\hat{x},\pi]\}\}.$$
As \( u(\hat{x}) > \Psi(\hat{x}) \), it follows that \( \mathbb{E}(u(X_S)) > \mathbb{E}(\Psi(X_S)) \). Thus,

\[
\mathbb{E}(u(X_S) - \int_0^S c(X^i_t) dt) > \mathbb{E}(\Psi(X_S) - \int_0^S c(X^i_t) dt).
\]

Note that, by Itô’s lemma, the process \( \Psi(X^i_t) - \int_0^t c(X^i_s) ds \) is a martingale. By Doob’s optional sampling theorem, agent \( i \) is indifferent between the equilibrium strategy \( \tau \) and the bounded time strategy \( S \), i.e.,

\[
\mathbb{E}(\Psi(X_S) - \int_0^S c(X^i_t) dt) = \mathbb{E}(\Psi(X_\tau) - \int_0^\tau c(X^i_t) dt) = \mathbb{E}(u(X_\tau) - \int_0^\tau c(X^i_t) dt).
\]

The last step follows because \( u(x) \) and \( \Psi(x) \) coincide for all \( x \in (\underline{x}, \overline{x}) \). Consequently, the strategy \( S \) is a profitable deviation, which contradicts the equilibrium assumption.

Q.E.D.

**Proof of Theorem**

The function \( \Phi \) is Lipschitz continuous with constant \( \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \). Consequently, it suffices to prove the Lipschitz continuity of \( F^{-1} \) to get the Lipschitz continuity of \( F^{-1} \circ \Phi \). The density \( f(\cdot) \) is

\[
f(x) = \frac{F(x)^{-n+2}}{n-1} \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \int_\underline{x}^x c(z) \phi(x-z) dz = \frac{F(x)^{-n+2}}{n-1} \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left( \int_\underline{x}^x c(z) dz - \mu F(x)^{n-1} \right)
\]

As \( f(x) > 0 \) for all \( x > \underline{x} \), it suffices to show Lipschitz continuity of \( F^{-1} \) at 0.

We substitute \( x = F^{-1}(y) \) to get

\[
(f \circ F^{-1})(y) \geq \frac{1}{n-1} \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left( y^{2-n} \left( \min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]} c(z) (F^{-1}(y) - F^{-1}(0)) - \mu y \right) \right).
\]

Rearranging with respect to \( F^{-1}(y) - F^{-1}(0) \) gives

\[
F^{-1}(y) - F^{-1}(0) \leq \frac{(n-1)\sigma^2}{2} (f \circ F^{-1})(y) + \mu y \frac{y^{n-2}}{\xi} \leq \frac{(n-1)\sigma^2}{2} f(\overline{x}) + \mu \frac{y^{n-2}}{\xi}.
\]
This proves the Lipschitz continuity of $F^{-1}(\cdot)$ for $n > 2$. Note that for two agents $n = 2$ the function $F^{-1}(\cdot)$ is not Lipschitz continuous as $f(\bar{x}) = 0$. However, we show in the following paragraph that $F^{-1} \circ \Phi$ is Lipschitz continuous for $n = 2$.

$$F(x) = \int_{\bar{x}}^{x} c(z) \mu (1 - \phi(x - z)) dz$$

$$\leq \sup_{z \in [\bar{x}, x]} \frac{c(z)}{\mu} \left(x - \bar{x} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} (1 - \phi(x - \bar{x}))\right)$$

A second order Taylor expansion around $\bar{x}$ yields that, for an open ball around $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{x} < x$, we have the following upper bound

$$x - \bar{x} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} (1 - \phi(x - \bar{x})) \leq \frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2} (1 - \phi(x - \bar{x}))^2.$$

For an open ball around $\bar{x}$, we get an upper bound on $F(x) \leq \frac{2\sigma^2}{\mu^2} (1 - \phi(x - \bar{x}))^2$ and hence the following estimate

$$1 - \phi(x - \bar{x}) \geq \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\pi} F(x)}.$$

We use this estimate to obtain a lower bound on $f(\cdot)$ depending only on $F(\cdot)$

$$f(x) = \frac{2}{\sigma^2} \left(\int_{\bar{x}}^{x} c(z) \phi(x - z) dz\right) \geq \frac{2c}{\sigma^2} \left(\frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} (1 - \phi(x - \bar{x}))\right)$$

$$\geq \frac{c}{\mu} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\pi} F(x)}.$$

Consequently, there exists an $\epsilon > \bar{x}$ such that, for all $x \in [\bar{x}, \epsilon)$, we have an upper bound on $\frac{(\phi \circ \Phi^{-1} \circ F)(x)}{f(x)}$. Taking the limit $x \to \bar{x}$ yields

$$\lim_{x \to \bar{x}} \frac{(\phi \circ \Phi^{-1} \circ F)(x)}{f(x)} \leq \lim_{x \to \bar{x}} \frac{(\phi \circ \Phi^{-1} \circ F)(x)}{\frac{c}{\mu} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma^2}{2\pi} F(x)}} \leq \sqrt{\frac{2\pi \mu^2}{\sigma^2 \sigma^2}} \frac{(\phi \circ \Phi^{-1})(\bar{y})}{\sqrt{y}} = 0.$$

**Q.E.D.**

**Proof of Proposition 4 and 5** Rearranging the density condition $1 = F(\bar{x}) = \frac{c}{\pi} |\Delta - \frac{a^2}{2\sigma^2} (1 - \phi(\Delta))|$ yields

$$\exp(-\frac{2\mu\Delta}{\sigma^2}) = -\frac{2\mu}{\sigma^2} |\Delta - \left(\frac{\mu}{c} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu}\right)|.$$

The solution to the transcendental algebraic equation $e^{-a\Delta} = b(\Delta - d)$ is $\Delta = d + \frac{1}{a} W_0\left(\frac{ae-a}{b}\right)$, where $W_0 : [-\frac{1}{e}, \infty) \to \mathbb{R}_+$ is the principal branch of the
Lambert $W$-function. This branch is implicitly defined on $[-\frac{1}{e}, \infty)$ as the unique solution of $x = W(x) \exp(W(x))$, $W \geq -1$. Hence,

$$\Delta = \frac{\mu}{c} + \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} [1 + W_0(-\exp(-1 - \frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}))]$$

and

$$\phi(\Delta) = \exp(-\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2} - 1 - W_0(-\exp(-1 - \frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2})))$$
$$= \exp(-1 - y - W_0(-\exp(-1 - y)))$$
$$= h(y).$$

Note that $\phi(\Delta)$ only depends on $y = \frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}$. Moreover, $h(y)$ is strictly decreasing in $y$, as $W_0(\cdot)$ and $\exp(\cdot)$ are strictly increasing functions. For constant costs, the feasibility condition from Lemma 8 reduces to

$$1 = \int_{-\frac{x}{\sigma}}^{\frac{x}{\sigma}} F'(x)\phi(x)dx$$
$$= \frac{c\sigma^2}{2\mu^2} [\frac{1}{2} \phi(x) + \frac{1}{2} \phi(2\frac{x}{\sigma} - x) - \phi(\frac{x}{\sigma})].$$

Dividing by $\phi(x)$ gives

$$\phi(-x) = \frac{c\sigma^2}{2\mu^2} [\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \phi(\Delta)^2 - \phi(\Delta)]$$
$$= \frac{1}{y} [\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} h(y)^2 - h(y)]$$
$$= \frac{1}{2y} (1 - h(y))^2$$
$$= g(y)$$

Note that $g : \mathbb{R}^+ \to [0, 1]$ is strictly decreasing in $y$. We calculate $x$ as

$$x = -\phi^{-1}(\phi(-x)) = -\frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} \log\left(\frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2 \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \phi(\Delta)^2 - \phi(\Delta)}\right).$$

Simple algebraic transformations yield the expression for $x$ and $\overline{x}$ (inserting $\Delta$) in Proposition 4.
We plug in $x$ to get:

$$F(0) = \frac{c}{\mu} \left[ -x - \frac{\sigma^2}{2\mu} (1 - \phi(-x)) \right]$$

$$= \frac{c\sigma^2}{2\mu^2} \left[ \log \left( \frac{1}{y} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\phi(\Delta)^2 - \phi(\Delta)}{2\mu^2} \right) + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\phi(\Delta)^2 - \phi(\Delta)}{2\mu^2} \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{y} \left[ \log \left( \frac{1}{y} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{h(y)^2 - h(y)}{y} \right) + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{h(y)^2 - h(y)}{y} \right]$$

$$= \frac{1}{y} \left[ g(y) - \log(g(y)) - 1 \right]$$

Hence, the value of $F(0)$ depends on the value of the fraction $y = \frac{2\mu^2}{c\sigma^2}$ in the above way, which completes the proof of Proposition 5.

**Proof of Theorem 3** By Proposition 5 it suffices to show that the profit $F(0)$ is increasing in $y$. Consider the following expression from the previous proof:

$$F(0) = \frac{1}{y} \left[ g(y) - \log(g(y)) - 1 \right]$$

The function $x - \log(x)$ is increasing in $x$. Hence, $g(y) - \log(g(y)) - 1$ is decreasing in $y$, because $g(y)$ is decreasing in $y$. As $\frac{1}{y}$ is also decreasing in $y$, the product $\frac{1}{y} \left[ g(y) - \log(g(y)) - 1 \right]$ is decreasing in $y$.

**REFERENCES**


